A risk profile for 2026–2035, with an outlook to 2050
A risk assessment for senior civil servants in Hungary, built on measured data: the national homogenised daily climate grid (1971–2025), the national groundwater monitoring network, river gauges and international decadal predictions. It asks which climate hazards already deviate from planning assumptions, where the country is most vulnerable, and where the data needed to quantify the risk are missing.
József Feiler · Csaba Nemes · Péter Kardos · Péter Szabó · October 2026 · English courtesy translation of the Hungarian original (DOI 10.5281/zenodo.23430763) · The rest of this site is in Hungarian.
The study examines what Hungary needs to prepare for in 2026–2035, with an outlook to 2050. It is based on domestic measurement series, the two domestic climate projections and the international literature published since the IPCC’s Sixth Assessment Report. It examines which of the measurable hazards have changed and to what extent, and which decisions rely on this information.
It follows established practice in public-administration risk assessment: it considers the reasonable worst-case scenario, after ruling out highly improbable ones. It does not state exactly what will happen; it indicates what to prepare for and which mistakes would prove more costly. In the authors’ words, the aim is “not to summarise the scientific consensus, but to present the risks that are important from a decision-making perspective, their magnitude and the potential cost of error.”
The three questions of the assessment
Models and their limits. Climate models are the best tools available, and the study relies on them throughout: the two domestic projection sets (HungaroMet’s four regional runs and the 28 bias-corrected regional runs of the FORESEE-HUN database) and decadal predictions downscaled to Hungary. That models capture as much as they do is a major achievement. Reality, however, is more complex than any model can represent: there are known technical limits, and there are factors on which we currently have no reliable knowledge. Where the observations already sit above the whole range of model runs, the study therefore does not plan from the model average.
The planning-minimum rule. Where domestic climate models fall short of measured data, the measured value serves as the starting point, while the lower limit of the model range represents the smallest conceivable value – not the best-case scenario. The rule was verified separately for each indicator and is applied only where it can be justified. For the duration of dry spells, the level of intense rainfall and the number of extremely hot days reaching 35 °C, the models do not fall short of the measured values, and the rule does not apply.
| Indicator | What the domestic dataset measured | What the domestic model provides |
|---|---|---|
| Annual mean temperature | 9.9 °C (1971–1990) → 11.5 °C (2006–2025) | The median of the runs reaches the measured level 13–16 years later; none of the 28 runs reaches it |
| Number of days reaching 30 °C | The measured value exceeds the range of the official projection in 16 of 20 counties and 136 of 173 districts | The official four-run projection remains below the measured value |
| Spring frost | Bud burst occurred twelve days earlier, while the date of the last spring frost remained unchanged | None of the 14 runs of the moderate emission scenario reaches the measured value |
| Summer vapour pressure deficit (the driving force behind evaporative demand) | +73 Pa/decade (1971–2025); in 2021–2025 +39 per cent compared with the 1971–1980 average | None of the 28 runs reproduces this, on any emission pathway |
Uncertainty without probabilities. The most serious domestic outcomes are compound events – groundwater failing to recover after a dry winter, accompanied by summer heat and low river flows. Their joint probability cannot be reliably estimated from the available data, and because the hazards share a common cause, assuming independence would underestimate their joint occurrence. The findings therefore carry a confidence level, not a probability class.
Two ways to be wrong. One can prepare for something that does not happen, or fail to prepare for something that does. In a planning context, failing to prepare is the more costly mistake: the consequences of a missed investment span decades and are partly irreversible, while the cost of unnecessary preparation is one-off and visible. The authors state openly that weighing these two errors is a value judgement, not a scientific finding.
Confidence levels.
Based on measured data and confirmed by several independent lines of measurement; public source data, reproducible calculation, verified by independent re-calculation.
A measured indicator based on a short period, a single event, or partly on preliminary data or expert assessment. The trend is well established; frequency or magnitude is not.
The phenomenon is measurable, but its cause or magnitude cannot be identified from domestic data because the necessary time series is missing.
Data. The analysis uses data from HungaroMet’s open data portal, the National Water Authority’s data service, the National Adaptation Geoinformation System (NATéR) and the Copernicus Climate Change Service. Model-based estimates draw on the bias-corrected regional runs of the FORESEE-HUN database (Department of Meteorology, ELTE), on decadal predictions downscaled to Hungary by the National Observatory of Athens within the Augures project, and on the regional database of the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report. The calculations were made from the source data with AI support and were subjected to independent re-calculation, which does not necessarily reveal blind spots arising from a common methodological approach.
Not covered: estimates of drought damage to the national economy, return periods, the total water balance, the climatic attribution of individual events and an aggregate “cost of inaction”. The limits of the analysis are set out in Annex E of the full report.
For average temperature, the number of hot days, spring frosts and the vapour pressure deficit, none of the available domestic model forecasts show the rate of change already indicated by the latest measurements. The measured data should be treated as the planning minimum.
East of the Danube, water levels are falling in 98 per cent of wells, even though winter half-year precipitation has not decreased. The cyclical recovery has essentially ceased since 2014. In August 2026, 79 per cent of the wells in the national monitoring network were at their lowest recorded levels.
It is not known whether drought or increased extraction is the cause, as a significant proportion of water abstraction remains unmeasured. Putting that measurement in place is one of the most urgent steps.
The summer vapour pressure deficit has increased by 39 per cent since the 1970s; none of the 28 domestic model runs predicted this. The duration of dry spells did not increase up to 2025, but 2026 brought the longest in the 125-year record.
The risks share a common cause and therefore occur together; preparations must be scaled to cope with two consecutive poor years.
In 2024, around 2,300 deaths can be attributed to heat, while cause-of-death statistics listed heat in only 27 cases. The heat burden for people aged 75 and over was 3.2 times the 1991–2020 level in 2021–2025.
In Hungary, the 2 °C level corresponds to an annual mean temperature about 1.9 °C warmer than the 1991–2020 average; the 2.5 °C level to 2.5 °C warmer. The Alpine ice reserves feeding the Danube will have fallen by about half by 2050.
There is no official Hungarian damage account. According to European figures, weather and climate-related damage in Hungary amounted to 12.8 billion euros (2024 prices) between 1980 and 2024; 78 per cent occurred in just five years, and only 4.8 per cent was insured.
Findings as stated in the short assessment (section 01), shortened; figures, sources and caveats are in the PDFs.

Measurements, projections, three possible courses of the coming decade, the 2050 outlook, actions by sector and methodological annexes.

The essence of the full report: key findings, how uncertainty is handled, the 2050 design level and policy decisions.
English version. Courtesy translation of the Hungarian original, produced by machine translation (DeepL) and checked against the Hungarian text; not professionally edited. The Hungarian text is authoritative. Figures and maps carry Hungarian labels; their captions are in English. Hungarian originals: full report · short assessment.